The Miskito Nation and the Geopolitics of Self-Determination by Nietschmann, Bernard
Journal of Political Science 
Volume 19 Number 1 Article 3 
November 1991 
The Miskito Nation and the Geopolitics of Self-Determination 
Bernard Nietschmann 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nietschmann, Bernard (1991) "The Miskito Nation and the Geopolitics of Self-Determination," Journal of 
Political Science: Vol. 19 : No. 1 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol19/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact commons@coastal.edu. 
THE MISKITO NATION AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF 
SELF-DETERMINATION 
Bernard Nietschmann 
University of California , Berkeley 
Nations and States 
Two dramatically different geopolitical assertions ofter-
ritorial organization exist. The first portrays the world as being 
partitioned into 171 First, Second and Third World states which 
claim sovereignty over all the lands, 40 percent of the oceans, and 
the lower reaches of space, and the planet's 5000 distinct peoples. 
Almost all academic analysis and state and international policies 
are based on this world-of-states geopolitical assertion. The sec-
ond geopolitical assertion depicts that world as having some 5000 
Fourth World nations, each the territory of a distinct people who 
claim exclusive control of land (and sometimes sea) areas and 
resources, and most of whom never agreed to being part of a state 
which is usually considered to be an invading and occupying 
force. 
The first geopolitical assertion supports a political and 
cartographic fiction that only the state is a nation and only a state 
can have a people, and all other non-state claims to territory or 
nationality are either illegitimate, irrational, or irrelevant. The 
second geopolitical assertion is behind 75 percent of the world's 
110 contemporary wars and hundreds more political conflicts 
over nation rights to territory and resources, autonomy and self-
determination, and culture, language and religion 1• Much of the 
world's stocks of forests, minerals, fresh water, and fish are in 
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FIG. 1 THE MISKITO NATION 
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nation lands and waters, not those of states. To regain control over 
their territories, resources and identities, nation peoples from the 
Ukraine, Lithuania, Russia, Palestine, Xinjiang, Tibet, Catalunya, 
Eritrea, Kashmir, Tamil Eelam, Kawthoolei and elsewhere on 
every continent, are forcing this second geopolitical assertion 
upon reluctant and unrelenting states which will likely create a 
new geopolitical world order of decentralized states and inde-
pendent or autonomous nations. 
Though academics and journalists may confuse and mis-
use the terms state and nation and people and ethnic group 2, 
people directly involved in these political and military conflicts 
know where their country is and who they are. 
Many of the issues of conflict between states and nations 
and their impact on local, regional and international geopolitics 
are represented in the political-cultural fracture area of eastern 
Central America. 
The Miskito Nation 
A large nation is located where the Central American 
isthmus juts into the Caribbean . Most maps and atlases do not 
show it but it is there nonetheless. It is almost twice as large as El 
Salvador. It has the region's longest river, most extensive forests, 
biggest continental shelf, richest fisheries, proven oil and mineral 
deposits, and greatest hydro-electric potential. 
For 500 years it has resisted invasions and occupations by 
armies sent by kings and dictators. When the Caribbean was the 
main theater of European comflict, this nation was an important 
factor. Centuries later when the superpowers backed opposing 
sides in a civil war, this nation advanced its own third-side 
political and military struggle, receiving world attention when it 
fought Central America's largest army to a standstill and when it 
initiated the first peace negotiations of any of the armed groups in 
all of Central America. 
Land and Sea Territory 
This Caribbean coast nation is the Miskito nation, Miskito 
Masrika. sometimes called Won Tasbaia ("Our Land"). It has a 
land area of 37,000 km2 (14,300 mi2)- the size of Tia wan or the 
Netherlands, and a sea area of 50,000 km2 (19,300 mi2). It 
extends 650 kms along the Caribbean from Cabo Camaron to 
Pearl Lagoon, 400 kms (250 mi) up the Wangki River (Rio Coco) 
to Y akalpani - the westernmost Miskito community, and east 
more than 320 kms (200+ mi) to the edge of the continental shelf 
and to many of the banks and cays beyond (Fig. 1). 
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As seen by the Miskito people, their territory is bordered 
by the deep-water Caribbean to the east, the Rama nation to the 
south, and Nicaragua, the Sumo nation and Honduras to the west. 
As seen by most of the Hondurans and Nicaraguans, there is no 
such thing as the Miskito nation; the territory and peoples are part 
of one or the other state. This cartographic delusion has produced 
a waste pile of terms given by Tegucigalpa and Managua to the 
occupied territories: La Costa Mosquitia, La Reserva Mosquitia, 
Departamento de Zelaya, La Mosquitia, Gracias a Dios, Costa 
Atlantica, Zelaya Norte, '.Zona Especial I, Region Autonoma 
Zelaya Norte, and Region Autonoma del Atlantico Norte. Within 
the east coast area occupied by Nicaragua, the Miskito, Sumo and 
Rama nations are collectively called Yapti Tasha by those who 
were in and who supported the armed indigenous resistance. This 
same area is usually referred to by Nicaraguans as the Costa 
Atlantica. 
The Miskito nation has four major environmental regions. 
Averaging 120 kms in width, the continental shelf and its shallow 
waters are rich in fish, shrimp, lobster and sea turtles. The 
lowlands fronting the sea are 5 to 30 kms in width and include the 
biggest concentration of coastal lagoons in Central America 
(Karataska is 100 km long) which contain abundant fish, shellfish, 
and resident and migratory waterfowl. Inland, is a large savanna 
of low rolling topography with poor pebbly soils dominated by 
lowland Caribbean pine (good for shipbuilding). Westward, is 
tropical forest with valuable mahogany and cedar, and as the land 
rises the mineral region begins, known for its moderate amounts 
of gold, but little explored. Cutting across these environments are 
some of Central America's major rivers: the Patuca, Wangki 
(Coco), Prinsapolka, Awaltara (Rio Grande) and Kuringwas. 
Overall, the area has abundant freshwater, large forests and 
fisheries, and, though it is in the rainy, humid tropics, sunny skies 
and tradewinds dominate over more than half the year. 
Identity 
The Miskitos see themselves as a single people based on 
a common ancestry, culture, language, society, institutions, terri-
tory and history . They claim sole rights of possession over their 
conterminous territory which is made up of an unbroken mosaic 
of demarcated community lands that stretch north and south for 
650 kilometers and east and west up to 800 kilometers. The 
Miskitos assert that the only way to be within their territory is by 
invitation or invasion. The Hondurans and Nicaraguans assert the 
Miskitos are an ethnic group without rights to anything beyond 
immediate community lands, and the rest is national land and sea 
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available for development. The Miskitos reject being referred to 
as a minority or ethnic group. During a 1985 peace negotiation, 
Sandinista Comandante Luis Carrion said that "Nicaragua is 
disposed to protect the culture of Nicaraguan Indian ethnic groups." 
In response, Brooklyn Rivera, Miskito coordinator of the 
Misurasata resistance, said, "Ethnic groups run restaurants. We 
have an army. We are a people. We want self-determination." 
Population 
The Miskitos have a population of some 200,000 (almost 
the number of independent Belize) including 150,000 in the area 
claimed by Nicaragua, and 50,000 in the area claimed by Hondu-
ras. They are the third most numerous of the almost 50 nation 
peoples in Central America, well after the 5,000,000 Mayans 
(representing 22 groups in territory claimed by Guatemala), and 
as many as 1,000,000 Pipil and Lenca (territory claimed by El 
Salvador). 
Nicaraguans say the Miskitos are but 5 percent of the 
population who are claiming almost one-half of the country. The 
Miskitos say that they are 100 percent of their country and that 
Nicaragua is claiming two-thirds and Honduras one-third. 
Settlements 
Before the Sandinista-Miskito war of the 1980s, there 
were more than 260 communities, each with a population of 
between 500 and 1000 people. The Sandinistas burned to the 
ground 65 of the Wangki River's 100 communities, the region of 
greatest population concentration (people are now returning to 
rebuild). A second concentration of settlements is located be-
tween Bilwi (Puerto Cabezas)- considered by the Miskito to be 
their capital - and Kip (Cabo Graci as a Dios), an area containing 
20 communities. Other settlement concentrations are found 
around Pearl Lagoon in the south and Karataska Lagoon (with 
Puerto Lempira) in the north, and along the many rivers. 
The largest Miskito settlements are Bilwi (30,000) and 
Puerto Lempira (18,000), which also have many Ladinos (Nica-
raguans and Hondurans, respectively) who generally work in 
branches of the state government or in small private businesses. 
Other areas of non-Miskito concentration are to the west, along 
the upper reaches of the rivers and interfluvial areas (called "the 
interior" by the Miskitos) where people from Honduras and 
Nicaragua are moving eastward, homestead by homestead, into 
the Miskito nation. A third area of Ladino concentration are the 
military bases: those of the Nicaraguan Ejercito Popular Sandin-
ista (EPS) garrisons in Kamla, Tronquera, Waspam, San Carlos 
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and the mining communities, totaling some 7,000 in all - down 
from 20,000 during the war; and the Honduran Fifth Battalion in 
Rus Rus, Mokoron, and Puerto Lempira, with about 3,000 -
down from 5,000 during the war. 
Though claimed by Honduras and Nicaragua, the Miskito 
nation remains effectively isolated from both. Only one narrow 
dirt road - from Managua to Bilwi - seasonally connects the 
Miskito nation with the outside, and takes two to three days in a 
four wheel drive vehicle equipped with a winch. All other 
transportation into and out of the area is either by airplane, boat, 
or foot. Large airfields are at Bil wi and Puerto Lempira, Waspam, 
the mines, Auka, and smaller ones dot the northern area where 
refugees and guerrilla fighters were supplied during the 1980s. 
Modest port facilities are found at Puerto Lempira and Bil wi ( once 
a mile long, the wharf was shortened by half by Miskito sabotage 
during the war). 
Miskito History and History of the Miskito 
Two distinct histories explain the past of the Miskito 
people. One is a Miskito history by outsiders that justifies 
invasion and annexation attempts. The other is a Miskito history 
by Miskitos that justifies territorial ownership and defense. 
Miskut's People 
Miskito history establishes the development of the Mi-
skito people and nation along the coastal shore and rivers of the 
Kabu Tara (Caribbean). The original people migrated along the 
shoreline and settled where there were rich coastal resources. 
Later a warrior leader named Miskut founded a settlement at 
Sitawala in the coastal lagoon near the mouth of the river later 
named the Wangki. His family stayed in Sitawala but his follow-
ers (Miskut uplika nani) split into three groups which expanded 
and absorbed other peoples: the first went south and founded 
Bihmuna, Uskira, Li Dakura and Dakura along the coast; the 
second went up the Wangki and established new communities 
with people they defeated; and the third went north and created 
communities as far as Brus Lagoon. All of the communities were 
headed by the Miskut u~ nani which later came to be shortened 
to Miskito. The descendants continued to share a common identity 
through the same language and social, economic and political 
rules. This is how the Miskito came to be one people with one 
territory. This version of Miskito history is similar to the develop-
ment of many nations: expansion, absorption, stability. 
The Miskito Nation fill.d European Superpowers 
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Beginning in the sixteenth century, the European mari-
time powers exported their conflicts to the Caribbean. England 
and other North European countries ignored the 1493 Treaty of 
Tordesillas by which the Pope divided the new discoveries be-
tween Spain and Portugal at 40 degrees W. longitude ("The 
Pope's Line"), with Spain making claim to everything west. 
When the Europeans came, the Miskito response was 
direct: defend and repulse those who tried military occupation and 
demanded slaves, tribute and taxes, and trade with the rest. The 
Spaniards tried to invade, annex and tax and became the Miskitos' 
enemies; the English came to trade and fight the Spaniards and 
they became the Miskites' allies and stayed for more than 200 
years. 
While Spain sought riches, subjects and tribute, England 
sought trading relations and allies to fight Spain. The Miskitos 
would have nothing to do with Spain's demands for tribute and 
later taxes, and sided with England. A private English trading 
company was established on Providence Island in 1633, less than 
100 miles off the Miskito nation and soon English pirate vessels 
were anchored in Miskito harbors. 
Pirates and buccaneers came because the Miskito nation 
was located at the only chokepoint along Spain's Panama-Cuba 
treasure route. Spain found gold, silver and jewels in South Amer-
ica, riches that were taken to Portobello on the Caribbean where 
the heavily guarded treasure fleet was loaded. Then the treasure 
fleets sailed north toward Havana across open sea until encounter-
ing the vast expanse of reefs and shoals that extend from the 
Miskito nation's waters to Jamaica, where the ships had to slow 
and break formation to pass through the chokepoint channels 
located between the reefs and between the reefs and mainland 
(Fig. 2). 
The Miskito Coast offered many other strategic advan-
tages to pirates. The pirate vessels had safe anchorage at Old Cape 
and Sandy Bay where nearby pine forests yielded worm -resistant 
lumber and pitch and resin to repair the vessels. Food and fresh 
water were abundant. The Miskitos were skilled small boat 
seamen (the English word dory comes from the Miskito dori) and 
assisted in the repairs, and worked with some of crews as harpoon-
ers, pilots and fighters. The pirate vessels were smaller and 
quicker and drew less water than the Spanish ships and though 
outgunned could outmaneuver them in the shallow, reef-strewn 
waters. 
The Miskitos prospered with English trade, exchanging 
tropical woods, dyes, animal skins, hawksbill shell, and dried 
meat and fish for firearms, gunpowder, lead, tools, cloth, cooking 
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utensils, rope and nails. These trade goods permitted them to 
expand control and collection of tribute from what is today Belize 
south to Bocas del Toro in Panama. From the mid 1600s to the late 
1800s, the Miskito region became one of the most prosperous 
areas in all of Central America, due to the abundant natural 
resources, ready access to English maritime shipping, the indus-
triousness of the Miskitos, and the absence of Spanish taxes that 
constrained economic development elsewhere in Central Amer-
ica. The Spanish colonial government ranted against Miskito free 
trade, the presence of the English, and the depredations by the 
pirates and their Miskito allies. 
Miskito trade and prosperity were threatened by Spanish 
territorial advances and the Miskito fought, sometimes with 
English help, against the Spaniards on land and at sea. One inves-
tigator complied a partial listing of Miskito-Spanish military 
battles that describes 25 between 1643 and 1814.3 The Miskitos 
sent 500 men in Miskito-built 60-foot sailing vessels to Jamaica 
in 1655 to assist Cromwell in taking the island from the Spaniards. 
In 1711 Spanish ships would not engage Miskito craft on Lake 
Nicaragua. In a 1723 naval engagement the Miskitos "totally 
destroyed a Spanish expeditionary force off the Honduran [Mi-
skito] coast. "4 
Diplomatic approaches were used by Miskito leaders to 
encourage Spain to replace military invasions with trade relations. 
"In 1711, and again in 1721, the Miskitos offered formal trade 
treaties with the governor of Costa Rica, who went so far as to 
receive and dine with the Miskito king in his palace, but would 
sign no treaty without Miskito submission to Spanish sover-
eignty ."5 As a result, no treaty was offered or signed. 
In 1800, a Miskito army laid siege to, defeated, and ousted 
the Spanish military garrison at Black River in the north, ending 
30 years of Spanish occupation. In so doing the Miskitos reas-
serted sovereignty over their nation twenty-one years before the 
Spaniards were forced to leave the other parts of the isthmus and 
the Central American states were formed. 
Control of~ Nicaraguan .camu ~ 
The Miskito nation was again thrust into international 
contention in the nineteenth century, this time over the proposed 
interoceanic canal route across Nicaragua, and again because of 
its strategic location. Great Britain had formed a protectorate over 
the Miskito nation, a favored trading partner, and a series of 
Miskito kings initiated by Britain had reigned for 200 years. But 
the discovery of gold in California heightened interest in building 
a canal to transport the flood of goods and peoples going to the 
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new gold fields. However, the Miskitos and their British allies 
controlled the Caribbean entrance to a potential canal. The United 
States sided with Nicaragua to remove the British and take over 
the Miskito nation. 
For the next 60 years foreign states made alliances and 
treaties between themselves over the Miskito nation. In 1850 the 
Clayton-Bulwer treaty between Nicaragua, the U.S. and Great 
Britain recognized less than one half of the territory of the Miskito 
nation. Consequently, Miskito representatives made several 
missions to convince these governments to recognize the entire 
territory. United States Secretary of State, Mr. Marcy, wrote 
responses in 1853 and 1856 to the Miskito demand that their 
nation be recognized: 
They have only possessory rights to the country 
they occupy and not sovereignty over it. The 
President cannot admit as true, and therefore can-
not under any possible circumstances advise the 
Republic of Nicaragua to admit that the Mosquito 
Indians are a State or Government any more than 
a band of Maroons in the island of Jamaica are a 
State or Government. 
The British unilaterally ceded the Miskito nation to Nicaragua 
in the 1860 Treaty of Managua. Informed consent was not 
obtained from the Miskito. 
The Article I. Her Britannic Majesty ... will recog-
nize as belonging to and under the sovereignty of 
the Republic of Nicaragua, the country hitherto 
occupied or claimed by the Mosquito Indians 
within the frontiers of the Republic, whatever that 
frontier may be. 
Article II. A district within the territory of the 
Republic of Nicaragua shall be assigned to the 
Mosquito Indians, which district shall remain, as 
above stipulated, under the sovereignty of the 
Republic of Nicaragua. 
Before the British left in the late nineteenth century, they 
did make cadastral surveys and gave a map and title with the 
boundaries to each community. 
In 1894, Nicaraguan President Zelaya ordered his army to 
invade and "reincorporate" the east coast. Residents of 
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Bluefields and some Miskitos to the north fought and drove out 
Zelaya's army for six months. The British secretly provided 600 
rifles from the ship Cleopatra, but a U.S. navy captain gave the 
location of the arms cache to Zelaya' s army before the rifles could 
be distributed. In February, 1905, Zelaya imposed "The 
Mosquito Convention" on the occupied Miskito nation and rounded 
up several Miskitos and forced them to sign "the 
reincorporation." Immediately thereafter the Nicaraguan presi-
dent named the area the "Departamento de Zelaya", invited in the 
United Fruit Company, and began to sack the wealth, a process 
that continued through the Somoza and Sandinista occupations. 
The twentieth century brought only exports from the Miskito 
nation. Very little was reinvested and the region became poor. 
During the Somoza dictatorships (1935-1979) foreign compa-
nies exported pine and tropical lumber and shrimp and sea turtles. 
The Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) 
promised to liberate the east coast indigenous people from the 
Somoza dictatorship but instead tried to force the people and their 
nations into the Sandinista state. FSLN MinisteroflnteriorTomas 
Borge said in an interview, "If you look at a map, you will notice 
that practically speaking it is another country, another geography, 
other customs. They feel as though they have lived within a 
separate civilization. "6 President Daniel Ortega recalled, "The 
FSLN proclaimed a special plan for the Atlantic Coast.. .. The 
nationalization of the natural resources was necessary to improve 
the living standards of the Atlantic Coast communities". 7 
This "special plan" was the attempt to ram the Sandinista 
revolution down Miskito throats and annex their land and re-
sources into Nicaragua and the Sandinista state. As a result, the 
Sandinistas and the Miskitos were at war by 1981, a year before 
the Contras. 
The Sandinista-Miskito conflict (1981-1989) was a state 
nation war over land and resources, not ideology as was the 
Sandinista-Contra civil war. Most of the leadership and fighters in 
the three armed resistance forces were Miskitos. Though they 
began with arms recovered from ambushed Sandinistas, by 1982 
the Miskitos needed more and better weapons and looked for 
allies. Misura and later Kisan had an arms alliance with the FDN 
("the Contras") in Honduras, and Misurasata was part of ARDE 
(the original Sandinistas) in Costa Rica. Concerned over auton-
omy demands, these allies limited the flow of weapons; neverthe-
less, the 6,000 mostly Miskito fighters successfully engaged the 
FSLN's 20,000. The Miskitos were the first to shoot down a 
helicopter (December, 1981 ), blow up Soviet tanks (May, 1983), 
and do an amphibious assault (October 1983). By the end of 1984, 
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Miskito military and political resistance had forced the FSLN to 
the negotiation tables to discuss autonomy (1984-1988). 
Foreign Claims to the Miskito Nation 
Rights to Miskito land, waters and resources come from 
birth and marriage, not immigration or invasion . 
A series of foreign claims and invasions have been made 
against the people and land and sea territory of the Miskito nation 
(Fig. 3). In the nineteenth century, Nicaraguan encroachment 
from the west, the British Protectorate, the 1860 Treaty of 
Managua's Miskito Reserve, and Nicaraguan President Zelaya' s 
1894 invasion greatly reduced the area under effective Miskito 
control, though these did not reduce by much the area settled by 
the Miskitos and hence their long-standing territorial claims. 
Foreign L.an.d Claims 
Soon after their formation in 1821 Honduras and Nicara-
gua began disputing their common border. A 1906 decision by 
Spain's King Alfonso VIII put the border at the Rio Coco 
(Wangki), ruling against Nicaragua's claim to all of the Miskito 
territory. Nicaragua did not ratify it. In 1960 the International 
Court of Justice upheld the 1906 decision. Miskitos in the north 
went to bed "Honduran" and woke up "Nicaraguan". 
Honduras wanted the Miskitos' territory but not the Mi-
skito people. Brutal treatment by the Honduran army caused 
thousands of Miskitos to cross the river never to return home. 
During 1962-63 international aid helped build 10 new communi-
ties for these people who were refugees within their own nation. 
During the 1960s the Honduran army routinely burned crops to 
force more people to leave. A force of 500 Miskitos was persuaded 
by Nicaragua not to attack Honduras during the July 1969 El 
Salvador-Honduras "Soccer War". 
Though Nicaragua occupied the southern two-thirds of 
the Miskito nation since its 1894 invasion, it never could subju-
gate the people nor control the area, even by unleashing 20,000 
soldiers and Soviet helicopter gunships in the 1980s. Miskito 
assertions of territorial rights are the primary reason that Hondu-
ras and Nicaragua maintain military forces in the occupied terri-
tories. 
Foreign ~ Claims 
Miskito sea territory is another area of regional conten-
tion. Miskito sea territory is another area of regional contention. 
Historically, the continental shelf has been demarcated and claimed 
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by Miskito coastal communities -- each of which has an exclusive 
sea territory. This same continental shelf sea territory is also 
claimed by Honduras, Nicaragua, and Colombia who themselves 
assert overlapping, conflictive sea territories. At issue have been 
the guano cays (Albuquerque, Quitasueno, Roncador, Serrana, 
Serranilla), the continental shelf, the mainland itself, fisheries, pe-
troleum, and competing claims to a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) under the 1982 United Nations Law of the 
Sea. In 1928 Colombia and Nicaragua agreed to a sea border at 82 
degrees W. longitude, but in 1980, Nicaragua unilaterally nulli-
fied the treaty. The alluvial islands that may have once marked the 
international frontier at Cabo Gracias a Dios are gone or shifted, 
and Honduras and Nicaragua now unilaterally assert overlapping 
EEZs. And overlapping Nicaragua's claim is a 1986 treaty be-
tween Colombia and Honduras. 8 
The Miskitos have historically delimited and defended 
their sea territory. The boundaries of the overall sea territory have 
long been established. Each of the 60 or so coastal communities 
has a delimited sea area that runs east from the lagoons to the edge 
of the continental shelf. The Miskitos have had naval engage-
ments in their waters with Spanish galleons and Sandinista gun-
boats. In the early 1970s Miskito turtlemen clashed with Jamaican 
fishermen and Managua was forced to revoke the Jamaicans' 
fishing permits. 
The land and sea boundaries of the Miskito nation were 
one of the main subjects of peace negotiations between the 
Sandinista government and the Miskito resistance (Misurasata 
and Yatama) from 1984-1988.9 
Resource Pirates fil1d 12.ryg Traffickers 
Miskito waters are now being invaded by resource pirates 
and drug traffickers. With the end of the war in 1989 and the 
change of the Nicaraguan government in 1990, coastal surveil-
lance by military helicopters and gunboats was virtually elimi-
nated and resource pirate vessels began to appear in increasing 
numbers. These shallow continental shelf waters have the greatest 
concentration of lobster, shrimp , fish and sea turtles in the Carib-
bean and these populations were replenished by the protection 
from almost a decade of war.10 Boats from Honduras, Colombia, 
Panama, Japan and elsewhere illegally take monthly catches 
estimated to be worth $2 million dollars. 
The Miskito Coast is beginning to be used as a transship-
ment area for cocaine trafficking from Colombia. The area is used 
to refuel drug boats heading north from Colombia and to transship 
cocaine from the Colombian island of San Andres to small craft 
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that carry it to Limon, Costa Rica where it is then hidden in the 
cargo of container ships destined for the U.S. and Europe. Unlike 
affluent Costa Rica, impoverished Nicaragua and the Miskito 
nation do not have a significant internal cocaine market. However, 
some of the Colombian lobster buyers do exchange cocaine for 
lobster with Corn Islanders, and, increasingly, Miskito fishermen. 
In response to these invasions of Miskito waters, and the 
absence of any Nicaraguan action, former Yatama combatants 
began in late 1990 to seek ways to raise a patrol force of small 
boats that will carry military weapons (the resource pirates and 
cocaine traffickers have AK-47 automatic rifles, and RPG-7 
rocket and M-79 grenade launchers). 
The Autonomous Regions 
The Miskitos' successful defensive war against the Sandin-
ista invasion compelled the FSLN to change from its 1979 1984 
stance of attempting to obliterate demands for autonomy to a 
1984-1990 position of trying to control autonomy. In the early 
1980s Miskito nationalists demanded autonomy and were jailed, 
tortured, killed and disappeared by Sandinista state security 
(DGSE) who accused them of being "separatists" working for the 
CIA. The communities supported the war for autonomy and they 
were bombed, looted, and burned to the ground, and 20,000 
people were forcibly relocated into FSLN-run camps and another 
40,000 became refugees. The FSLN's military offensive failed as 
it provoked more people to join the resistance which was winning. 
In December 1984 the FSLN changed tactics and initiated its plan 
for controlled autonomy which became a constitutional law in 
September 1987 (based on the USSR-Lithuania model as it was in 
1985). The east coast was to have internal self-government and 
decisions over local resource use. However, the exercise of 
autonomy was to be tightly controlled at the local level by insuring 
that only Frente Sandinista people were elected, and at the state 
level with legal provisions that the FSLN-dominated National 
Assembly and the State itself (FSLN National Directorate) could 
block any local decisions or actions. 
Two political administrative autonomous areas were es-
tablished: RAAN- Region Autonoma del Atlantico Norte, and 
RAAS - Region Autonoma del Atlantico Sur. The northern 
autonomous area RAAN covers mostly Miskito people and terri-
tory, while RAAS delimits the southern edge of the Miskito nation 
and includes other peoples as well. 
However, when the FSLN lost the national election on 
February 25, 1990, their control over the Miskito nation (and the 
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Sumo, Rama, and Creole nations) evaporated overnight, leaving 
the autonomy law unbuffered by Sandinista political and military 
officials. President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro established a 
new ministry, the Nicaraguan Institute for the Development of the 
Atlantic Region (INDERA), and named Brooklyn Rivera as head. 
Though RAAN and RAAS operate under post-war economic and 
political difficulties, a large portion of the Miskito nation does 
have nominal autonomy. And these developments directly influ-
ence increasing demands for autonomy by Miskitos living in the 
Honduran-occupied territory (many of whom fought in the war 
against the Sandinistas and operated clandestine communication 
and supply lines between Miskito refugee and military camps in 
"Honduras" and Miskito communities and guerrilla bases in 
"Nicaragua". Using the Miskito gains on autonomy as a model, 
other indigenous peoples submitted their own demands to the 
FSLN: the Sumo in 1986, and the Subtiava and Monimbo in 1988. 
Political Groups and Leadership 
Frustrated by the FSLN' s failure to transform the Miskitos 
into state-identifying Nicaraguan campesinos, in 1982, Sandin-
ista Minister of Agriculture Jaime Wheelock told Misurasata 
coordinator Brooklyn Rivera, "the real problem is not the Miskito 
leaders, its the Miskito people." The Cubans, Russians, Contras, 
CIA and U.S. State Department experienced similar frustrations 
and none could find a single person who could command the 
people to do what the outsiders wanted. This is because political 
decisions are reached by social consensus and social consensus is 
decentralized. Decisions are made by community consensus from 
public discussion, not by a voting majority or by one or more 
leaders. Historically, this has been an important factor in resisting 
invasion and integration. When a crisis or armed conflict occurred 
in the past, people organized a centralized command to deal with 
the problem and afterwards disbanded and went back to their 
communities. 
In the 1980s, the Miskitos launched not just a resistance 
but a revolution advanced by the only Indian army in the Ameri-
cas, a revolution to permanently change their relationship with the 
Nicaraguan state, to regain control of their territory and resources, 
and to develop and modernize their country. Though the war was 
over in 1989, the Miskito leaders and organizations did not 
disband as had occurred for centuries, but took part in the 1990 
local elections and are now the leaders of an autonomous govern-
ment. The revolution is on hold. The war and the Sandinistas 
destroyed the economic infrastructure and many of the communi-
33 
ties, and scattered thousands of Miskitos to 13 countries from Peru 
to Canada and Australia to Switzerland. Reconstruction and 
repatriation are the aut9nomous government's priorities. 
Contemporary Miskito political organizations trace their 
origin to the early 1970s when Wangki river people formed an 
agricultural cooperative to protect themselves from Ladino and 
Chinese river traders who bought low and sold high. In 1974, this 
cooperative evolved into the political organization ALPROMISU 
(Miskito and Sumo Alliance for Progress), which challenged the 
Somoza regime over its attempt to impose Spanish as the only 
language of the area and the giveaways of community pine forests 
to foreign companies. This was the precursor to Misurasata 
(Miskito, Sumo, Rama and Sandinista Unity) - formed at the 
first General Assembly in November, 1979 - which organized 
the communities and promoted Indian land and resource rights, 
workers' unions for fishermen, loggers and miners, and public 
health and literacy programs (formally agreed to at the second 
General Assembly in December, 1980). Banned by the FSLN in 
1981, Misurasata went underground at home and into exile and a 
military alliance with Eden Pastora 's ARDE forces in Costa Rica. 
Miskito exiles in Honduras formed Misura in 1982 which allied 
with the Contra FON force, and which then splintered to form 
Kisan in 1986. Under pressure from refugees, fighters and com-
munity people these three organizations formed Yatama in June, 
1987, at a week-long third General Assembly in Honduran-occu-
pied territory, attended by 2000 representatives from every Mi-
skito community. 
Within the autonomous RAAN and RAAS regions are 
Yatama, Frente Sandinista, and the central government's UNO 
political organizations. The locally elected governments have to 
find ways to accommodate the demands of these organizations, 
constituents and those of the more than 200 communities. Miskito 
people dominate all organizations and the autonomous govern-
ment in the RAAN area. The two autonomous regions are repre-
sented in Managua by six elected senators out of 54 in the National 
Assembly and by INDERA (Nicaraguan Institute for the Devel-
opment of the Atlantic Coast), headed by former Misurasata 
leader Brooklyn Rivera, which has a slim 1991 budget of 
$1,500,000 for an area almost the size of Costa Rica. 
Geopolitics and Ecopolitics 
Miskito military and political demands for autonomy and self-
determination in the 1980s had far-reaching political and geopo-
litical influences. Internationally the FSLN was besieged over 
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its Miskito policy, and internally it had to allocate 25-30percent 
of its military resources in literally another country, and in 
another war where it had no chance of military victory. Many 
foreign leaders spoke privately and unsuccessfully to the FSLN 
about resolving this conflict (Francois Mitterrand, Olaf Palme, 
and Willy Brandt, for example). The CIA, U.S. State Depart-
ment and the Contras failed to convince the Miskito resistance 
groups to join in the civil war against the FSLN, leaving a huge 
political and geographic gap in the effort to unite anti-Sandinista 
forces. Miskito political and military leaders shared and devel-
oped new strategies with representatives of many other nations 
who were fighting state invasions (e.g. Chittagong Hill Tracts, 
Kawthoolei, Eritrea, Nagaland, and West Papua). Many in 
Washington came to understand that the Miskito struggle was 
distinct from the Contra war and on two occasions the U.S. 
Congress earmarked funds for Misurasata (S5 million in 1986 
and $2.19 million in 1988). Though the Miskito conflict .and 
goals were not includedin the Central American peace plan 
(Esquipulas II), Costa Rica President Oscar Arias provided 
critical behind-the-scenes support to Misurasata and Yatama for 
negotiations with the FSLN. In September, 1989, in Bilwi, the 
capital of the Miskito nation, former President Jimmy Carter 
went eyeball to eyeball with FSLN Minister of Interior Tomas 
Borge over the FSLN ban against the return of Y atama leaders 
to run in the 1990 elections. Borge blinked, the ban was lifted, 
and the leaders returned and won. 
The connection between the Miskito resistance 
and the Sandinista election defeat was exaggerated in a 
front-page story in the USS R's Communist Party newspa-
per Pravda (translated by AFP wire service): 
Sandinistas Misjudged Indians and Lost 
Vote, Pravda Says 
Moscow, February 28 (AFP) - The op-
position in Nicaragua won a general elec-
tion on Sunday because it "took advantage 
of errors by the Sandinistas and acted with 
more flexibility", the Communist Party 
newspaper Pravda said on Wednesday. 
The Sandinistas were the revolutionary 
party in government, and Pravda said that 
they had committed "errors" in their rela-
tions with the Indian tribes such as the 
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Miskitos on the Atlantic coastline. 
"The central authorities did not take into 
account the traditions of the Indians nor 
of their tendency to keep their way of 
life and their autonomy." 
The Indians took up arms in neighboring 
Honduras and by the time the Sandinis-
tas decided to give them autonomy, "it 
was too late .... " 
The Miskito nation is pursuing a new ecopolitical ap-
proach to demarcate and buffer its territory, reunify north and 
south, and consolidate its autonomy. The plan is to ring the land 
and sea boundaries with as many protected areas as possible, 
including national parks, biological reserves, biosphere reserves, 
etc. (Fig. 4). This would be done by supporting state and interna-
tional initiatives to establish protected areas. In addition to the 
protected areas already in place in the Honduras occupied area, 
Nicaragua is introducing three others in the south. With these and 
others the Miskitos hope to curtail the eastward movement of 
Ladino agriculturalists into their territory, reduce resource over-
exploitation and destruction, and defend against resource piracy 
and drug trafficking. 
State Academia 
Two remarkable political-economic processes are occur-
ring simultaneously that are changing the outlines and very 
structure of states and the concepts of nationhood and sover-
eignty: the dismantling of many European states' powers to 
develop the European Community, and the worldwide pressure of 
nation peoples to withdraw from central state rule and to deter-
mine their own political destiny within a vast range of options 
from independence to greater autonomy. 
In spite of the fact that world is rapidly transforming into 
a new global order with emerging new patterns of decentralizing 
states and independent or autonomous nations (the USSR, Can-
ada, Yugoslavia, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Spain, etc.), most academ-
ics are but a marginal factor in the discussion of this process and 
the new politics of self-determination. This is because so many 
academic institutions, traditions and scholars are state creations 
and this produces one-sided analysis that justifies the state. In 
explaining any nation's assertion of self determination and auton-
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omy, most university and media people worldwide depend upon 
the terminology of the state (separatism, secession, balkanization, 
tribalism, ethnic groups, minorities, tribes, dissidents, extremists, 
rebels, peasants). None of these terms are those of the nation 
peoples themselves. All of these are state catchwords. 
As a result, many nation peoples prefer their own scholars 
and systems of communication to those of the state and consider-
able analysis is done on a nation-to-nation basis, which rarely 
enters into the archives of the state. The absence of academic 
literature should not be confused for the absence of analysis. 
Oren Lyons, a Faithkeeperof the Onondaga Nation (which 
is a member of the Haudenosaune - "Six Nations" - Confederacy), 
who was an observer at the Misurasata-FSLN peace negotiations, 
councels to nation peoples, 
We are the original people on this 
land. We are the land keepers. We are not 
a minority within our own nations, within 
our own lands. One must understand that 
terminology is very important. How you 
address yourself is very important to 
them .... So must speak of ourselves as a 
people .... Your try to change their termi-
nology, they will not accept it because it is 
that important. That terminology is just as 
important to you. So you should first rep-
resent yourself as what you are. Nations 
are not according to size, nations are ac-
cording to culture. 11 
FOOTNOTES 
1Nietschmann, Bernard "The Third World War," Cultural Survival 
Ouarterlv, 1987, Vol. 11. No. 3, pp. 1-16. 
2A nation is a geographically bounded territory of a common 
people who have a common ancestry, history, society, institu-
tions, ideology, language, area, and (often) religion. Today there 
are over 5000 nations in the world, 99.9 percent of which are not 
states. Most nations have persisted hundreds of years. 
A state is a centralized political system, recognized by other 
states, that uses a civilian and usually a military bureaucracy to 
enforce one set of institutions, laws and sometimes language and 
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religion within its claimed boundaries. regardless of the presence 
of pre-existing nations. Today there are 171 states in the world. 
Most of the states are less than 200 years old. More than one-half 
of the world's states did not exist before World War II. Only a 
handful of the states are, in fact, nation-states (e.g. Iceland); most 
are multi-national states and many operate as empires, controlled 
- often dominated - by one nation (the Russian nation once 
ruled the USSR's 130 nations, Java controls Indonesia's claim 
over more than 300 nations, and Burmans dominate the dozen 
nations claimed by Burma). 
A people is a self-defined group. A people has a common history; 
racial, cultural, linguistic and religious ties; a common territory or 
geographical location; and a common economic base. Peoples 
have international rights to identity, land, resources, self-govern-
ment, self-determination; ethnic groups do not. 
An ethnic group ( or minority) is comprised of people who by force 
or choice leave their nation to live in another nation or state where 
they have no historical or contemporary rights to a territory but 
maintain their distinctive identity (e.g. Han Chinese in San Fran-
cisco are an ethnic group, in northern China they are a people; 
Russians in Russia are a people, in Lithuania or New York they are 
an ethnic group). The concept of an ethnic group is embedded in 
state hegemony. A people cannot be an ethnic group while on its 
own land (Palestinians are not an Israeli ethnic group). Despite the 
terminological proclivities of academics and journalists, almost 
no people within its own territory consents to being demoted to an 
ethnic group because it strips a people of international rights to 
self-determination, a territory, a resource base and self-rule. 
Furthermore, some of the original meanings of the word "ethnic" 
include "heathen" and "neither Christian nor Jewish", a termino-
logical legacy which may account for the common derogatory 
assignation of"ethnic" to a lesser status of national identity, to an 
adolescent form of political maturity, and to an irrational-even 
dangerous - basis for political organization. 
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